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1  Introduction  
Risk aversion is a concept in economics of how people behave when they are exposed to 
uncertain outcomes. The concept of being risk averse is defined as the propensity to prefer an 
offer with an expected lower but more certain outcome, compared to an offer with a higher 
expected outcome with more risk. A more risk averse person is thus less inclined to make an 
investment with a fairly rewarding outcome if the outcome is uncertain, than a person who is 
less risk averse. For a poor peasant, this might imply little or no investment in modern 
production technologies that could lead the peasant out of poverty. Knowledge of risk 
behavior is thus of importance for public policy making in a pro-growth policy agenda. 
 
Are poor farmers more risk averse than western students? And is the degree of risk aversion 
in part determined by gender? This thesis examines risk attitudes amongst low-income 
peasants in the rural highlands of Peru. I will investigate gender specific differences in risk 
behavior amongst peasants in two regions in the rural southern Peruvian highlands1. I will 
examine whether or not the Peruvian women in our sample are more risk averse than men, 
with my hypothesis being 
 Peasant women in the Peruvian highlands are more risk averse than men. 
 
The empirical analysis is based on both quantitative and qualitative data. The main method 
used in this thesis is experimental. By using a risk game2 with real monetary rewards, 
conducted in the two regions in the southern Peruvian highlands, I was able to deduce the 
participants’ degree of risk aversion. The hypothesis will also be addressed by the data 
generated from both a questionnaire connected with the experiment and a survey of the larger 
research project Land and Gender in Peru. In addition, I collected qualitative data in the same 
period and the same area3 as the experiments of the one region was conducted. The qualitative 
data collection consisted of observing the participants and their decision-making process 
                                                
1 Henceforth referred to as Peruvian peasants/women/men for simplicity 
2 Conducted by Ragnhild H. Bråten, Doctoral Student at the Frisch Centre, and myself 
3 In the period October to November 2010 in Cusco, Peru 
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during the experiments, conversation with the participants after the game and conversations 
and interviews with other locals.  
 
In section 2 I give a textbook presentation of the theory of behavior under uncertainty relevant 
for my thesis. Most of the existing experimental literature on risk aversion and gender find 
women to be more risk averse than men. This is presented in section 3. However, I also 
present some papers suggesting no apparent link between gender and risk aversion. There also 
seems to be a distinction between the findings in the western world and the underdeveloped 
word. Most of the experimental research on risk aversion in the western world is conducted 
with a university student sample. As opposed to much of the literature from developing 
countries, the majority finds a significant gender-specific difference in risk aversion. There 
also appear to be a relationship between poverty and risk behavior. In section 3.3 I give a 
short presentation of the theoretical implications of risk aversion and poverty in the theory of 
poverty traps, postulating that poor peasants are highly risk averse because they are more 
vulnerable to negative shocks. And since they are more risk averse, they are more reluctant to 
undertake risky investments, which might push them out of poverty. In section 4, I present the 
method used to elicit risk aversion, the experimental design. I also discuss briefly some of the 
shortcomings with the method and the experimental design. The results and the discussion are 
shown in section 5. The sampling characteristics display the characteristics of the participants, 
who in short can be summarized as low-educated, low-income peasants with a highly gender 
segregated labor sphere. Nonetheless, in general they report to be satisfied with both their 
economic situation and health. The participants risk behavior is consistent with the expected 
behavior of poor peasants; the majority is either highly risk averse or risk loving. According 
to my regression analysis in section 5.3, women are significantly more risk averse than men. 
However, after controlling for principal work activity, there is no statistical evidence of 
gender-specific differences in risk behavior. Still, the only work activity with a significant 
effect on risk aversion, is housework. Only a minority of women has housework as their main 
activity, suggesting that there is still a gender difference with women being more risk averse 
than men. Furthermore my findings also suggest that men are significantly more extremely 
risk loving than women, and that this difference might be the driving force of gender 
differences in risk behavior.  All descriptive and econometric analysis has been executed by 
the use of the statistical software Stata11.  
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2 Theory of Risk Aversion 
How do economic agents behave when facing a risky choice? What constitute risk averse 
behavior? I will in this section give a brief overview of standard economic theory of decision 
making under risk, concentrated around the theory important for my experimental method. 
The theoretical presentation of risk aversion is based on chapter 8 “Uncertainty and Risk” in 
Frank Cowell`s book (2005) “Microeconomics, Principles and Analysis” and chapter 11 
“Uncertainty” in Hal R. Varian`s book “Microeconomic Analysis” (1992). 
 
2.1.1 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility 
Consider a representative economic agent faced with a risk game consisting of two choices; a 
safe amount, denoted by ! ≥ 0, and a binary lottery with a state contingent payoff  xᵩ ≥ 0 
depending on the state, denoted φ, realized. There are no negative payoffs; hence the agent is 
not faced with a budget constraint. All possible states are presented with Ω, and πᵩ denotes the 
probability of the state, normalized so as to sum to 1, !ᵩ!∈! = 1.  
 
Assume a game in which the agent can choose between a safe payoff and a lottery. The choice 
selected by the agent depicts his/her risk behavior. And the agents risk behavior in the game 
depends on his/her preferences for risk, his/her utility function. 
 
I will assume constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), so that a proportional change in each of 
the alternative payoffs does not alter the agents’ relative utility. Utility of a lottery, a monetary 
good in the risk game, when assuming CRRA, is represented with the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function (U)   
 
(2.1) !(!ᵩ) = !!(!!!)!!!   
 
Where  ! denotes the individual’s degree of risk aversion. 
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The appropriate measure for relative risk aversion is, following Varian (1992, p`189), the 
Arrow-Pratt measure: 
 
(2.2) ! = − !´´ ! !!´(!)  
 
Using the Arrow-Pratt measure, and the utility function (2.1), I can investigate the nature of 
the relative risk aversion depicted by the utility function. The first derivative of (2.1) is: 
 
(2.3) U´   !ᵩ = !!!! 
 
and the second derivative  
 
(2.4) U´´   !ᵩ = −!!!!!!! 
 
 
Inserting for (2.3) and (2.4) in (2.2)  
 
(2.5) ! = − !!!!!!!! !!!!!! = ! 
 
Equation (2.5) proves that the relative risk aversion denoted in (2.1) is constant at a rate !. A 
higher value of  !  implies higher degree of risk aversion, and a negative value of  ! denotes a 
risk loving attitude.  
 
The economic agent also has the choice of a safe payoff, γ. As this is a secure monetary 
reward, the probability connected with the safe payoff is equal to one. Still, the agents’ utility 
does depend on his/her degree of risk aversion. The more risk averse the agent is, the higher is 
her utility of a safe amount as opposed to the lottery. Utility of the safe amount,  ! γ , can thus 
be expressed as  
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(2.6) ! γ = !(!!!)!!!  
 
From (2.6) we see that the U(γ) is only affected by the monetary reward of the secure amount, γ, and the participants degree of risk aversion,  !. 
	  
 
2.1.2 Expected Utility and Risk Aversion 
Having defined the utility function of the state contingent good, assuming the standard 
necessary axioms, the expected utility for the state contingent good can be expressed. The 
agents’ utility depends on both the agents’ degree of risk aversion and the alternative payoffs. 
Ergo the maximization problem the agent faces is not a standard utility optimization where 
the agent “only” has to maximize his/her utility of the good. The agent needs to take the 
probabilities into account, when optimizing his/her utility of xᵩ, hence the agent must 
maximize his/her expected utility of xᵩ. I will express the expected utility (EU) function for 
the risky choice as (EUᵩ) represented by: 
 
(2.7)   EUᵩ = !ᵩ!(!ᵩ)!∈!  
 
Assume a situation with only two possible states of the world. Denote the outcome of the one 
state, !!, with the following probability !!, and the outcome of the other state, !!, with the 
following probability (1- !!). In the two-state risk game, EUᵩ can thus be expressed as 
 
(2.8) EUᵩ =   !!! !! + (1−   !!)! !!  
 
Inserting for ! !ᵩ  from (2.1) in (2.8)  
 
(2.9) EUᵩ =   !! !!!!!!!! + (1− !!) !!!!!!!!  
 
As stated in section 2.1.1, the probability connected with the safe amount equals 1, thus the 
expected utility of the safe amount can be expressed as  
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(2.10) E!ᵧ = ! γ = !(!!!)!!!  
 
 
Expected utility theory postulates that the agents’ choice does not depend on the highest 
expected value, but the highest expected utility of the value. I have illustrated the relation 
with expected utility, utility, and risk aversion in Figure 1, below. The possible outcomes are 
presented on the horizontal line, x. The utilities of the respective outcomes are drawn on the 
vertical line, U. Point a in figure 1 displays the monetary outcome, !!, on the horizontal line. 
The corresponding utility, depending on the agents degree of risk aversion, can be read from 
the vertical line, U(!!). Point b depicts the utility represented with outcome, !!, U(!!). In 
figure 1 I have drawn a linear line between point a and point b, representing the expected 
utility of the two states, EUᵩ. As both outcomes, !! and !!, have a have a probability of 50 %, 
the expected outcome (Ex) of the lottery is in point c. The corresponding expected utility of 
Ex is presented on the vertical axis (EUᵩ(x)).  
 
The agents utility function of the expected outcomes U(EX) is drawn as a concave curve, 
implying risk aversion. Hence the agent is willing to accept a lower outcome if it is more 
secure, in this case fully secure. This behavior is demonstrated in figure 1, by comparing point 
c, d and e. Point e represents the utility of Ex, where U(Ex)>EUᵩ(x), hence the agent values 
the utility of the expected value (point e) more than the expected utility (point c). Point d in 
figure 1 represents the utility of the safe amount  γ.  The secure outcome, γ, is less than the 
expected outcome of the lottery, Ex. However the utility of the secure payoff is higher than 
the expected utility of the lottery, U(γ)> EUᵩ(x). Thus the utility function indicated in this 
figure depicts a risk averse individual, who prefers the secure amount as opposed to the 
lottery even when the expected outcome of the risky prospect is higher.  
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    Figure  1.   Util ity  Function  of   a   Risk  Averse  Person     
  
   U 
                                        
	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
                 
                        !!                   γ    Ex                !!                                    x  
Note:	  γ	  represents	  the	  secure	  outcome.	  x!	  and  x!	  the	  possible	  outcomes	  of	  the	  lottery,	  each	  represented	  with	  a	  50%	  probability	  of	  occurring.	  The	  curvature	  of	  the	  utility	  function	  thus	  implies	  that	  the	  agent	  prefers	  the	  secure	  outcome	  to	  the	  lottery,	  even	  though	  the	  expected	  value	  of	  the	  lottery	  is	  higher	  tan	  the	  secure	  alternative.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
                                           
According to expected utility theory, the curvature of the utility function determines the risk 
preferences. A higher risk aversion is equivalent with a more concave utility function. A risk 
loving agent has a convex utility function, implying a negative value of  !. The risk loving 
agent values the expected utility more than the utility of the expected value. A risk neutral 
agent, on the other hand, has linear utility function.  
a  
b  
c   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U(!! )	  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!
)  
	  	  U(!")	  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!
) 
        U(!!)  !!!!!!!!!!!!!)        !"#(!)  !!!!!!!!!!)  
d   e  
U(EX)  
EUᵩ  !   
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3 Literature 
 
3.1 The Importance of Experimental Research 
The experimental method is not a newly valued tool in scientific inquiry, but has ever since 
the Renaissance been of importance (Levitt and List, 2009). The understanding of the 
importance of empirical testing of economic theory is nor a recent development within 
economics. The famous economist Ragnar Frisch is one of the early advocators’ for empiric 
exploration. He was concerned with the lack of empiric testing, and sought an “experimental 
and numerical verification” of economic models in “(...) a desire to turn pure economics . . . 
into a science.”  (Bjerkholt 2010, pp`22).   
There exists now a variety of experimental methods, such as lab experiments, artefactual field 
experiments, framed field experiments, natural field experiments and natural experiments 
(Levitt and List, 2009). In behavioral economics, the most common experimental method is 
laboratory experiments. Laboratory experiments are characterized by that the participants 
volunteer to participate and make decisions in a controlled environment (in a lab). The 
artefactual method resembles the laboratory, with the only difference being that the 
participants are so-called “non standard subjects” often from the environment of interest 
(Levitt and List, 2009). A framed field experiment differs from the artefactual in that it 
embodies contextual elements from the environment in question. This method is often used to 
test the implications of a policy implementation. Natural field experiments differ 
fundamentally from all the experimental methods described above, as the participants in the 
experiments do not know that they are participating. Finally, a natural experiment differs from 
all the above-mentioned experiments by the uncontrolled randomization of the sample. In 
other words, the researcher has not controlled the assignments of treatment.  
 
Standard economic theory tends to generalize economic preferences to be constant across 
borders. That if one specific experiment in one country, amongst one homogenous group, find 
women to be significantly more risk averse than men, then this must hold for all economic 
actors regardless of differences in geographical and demographical characteristics. The ruling 
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idea seems also to be that women are more risk averse than men: “Under different 
environments and tasks, the majority of studies about gender differences in risk- taking report 
the same conclusion: women are more risk averse than men” (Ergun, García-Muñoz, Rivas 
(2011, p`3). These gender specific differences in behavior are mainly explained by arguments 
based on either evolutionary theory or socialization theory. Croson and Gneezy (2009) 
explore ten different literature contributions investigating gender-specific differences in risk 
taking within experimental economics. The majority of the literature explored in Croson and 
Gneezy (2009) use a western student sample. The results from their study underpin Ergun et 
al. (2011) findings; women are more risk averse than men. Croson and Gneezy (2009) 
propose some probable explanations for the gender-specific difference, such as differences in 
emotions, overconfidence amongst men and differences in interpretation of the risky prospect. 
Nonetheless, they do suggest that these findings might be culturally biased.	  
  
However, there exists experimental literature contradicting this generalization, suggesting that 
attitudes towards risk are highly contextual. Henrich et al. (2005) conducted cross-cultural 
economic lab experiments in twelve countries, on four continents, where all the societies 
included in their sample differed in social, economic and cultural characteristics. Even though 
the experiments conducted were Public Good, Ultimatum and Dictator Game, they also 
investigated attitudes towards risk. They find that some societies act in accordance with 
expected utility maximization for risk neutral agents, whilst other groups experiences such a 
high degree of risk aversion that they “would be unable to function in variable environments” 
(Henrich et al., 2005, p´11).    
 
There is a growing amount of literature within behavioral economics investigating risk 
attitudes. Although the majority of the experiments investigating risk attitudes are conducted 
as lab4 experiments with western university students, increasing amount of experiments are 
now being conducted in developing countries. The degree of risk aversion and the effect of 
socio economic characteristics differ between experimental results, suggesting the importance 
of empirical research on attitudes towards risk.  “The nature of risk aversion (to what extent it 
exists, and how it depends on the size of the stake) is ultimately an empirical issue” (Holt and 
Laury, 2002, p`1644). 
                                                
4 I do not distinguish between lab experiment and artefactual field experiment in this thesis due to its similarities. 
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3.2 What Affects Risk Attitudes? 
As early as 1980, Binswanger (1980) expressed doubt on the truthfulness in the general idea 
that women are more risk averse than men. He used both interviews and lab experiments to 
elicit risk behavior in rural India amongst low-income farmers, and his findings show little 
support to the gender differences in risk behavior.  
 
Schubert, Brown, Gysler and Brachinger (1999) ran a lab experiment amongst undergraduate 
students from different academic fields in Switzerland. The experiment consists of four 
different framings, where the risk choice was presented differently in each framing (as an 
investment, an insurance, a gain-gambling, or as a loss-gambling choice). They find evidence 
that gender-specific risk behavior is frame-conditioned. Hence not only are gender differences 
explained by including socio economic variables, it is also dependent on the game framing. 
Binswanger (1980) also supports this finding, and claims further that certain games might 
resemble certain daily situations, which will affect how the participant acts. Daily situations 
differ most often across societies, thus a natural conclusion is that game behavior is society 
dependent. Schuberts et al.`s (1999) findings with a western university student sample suggest 
that it is differences in wealth, not gender, which explains most of the differences in risk 
attitudes. 
 
Using a US survey sample, Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) find that, compared to men, 
women´s aversion towards risk decreases less as wealth increases. Hence there is a significant 
difference in gender on the impact of wealth on risk behavior. More surprisingly they find that 
women exhibit a decreasing risk aversion with respect to age. As women age, they become 
less risk averse, whilst men tend to become more risk averse with age. They also find that 
education has a significant negative effect on risk aversion, and that the effect of education is 
bigger for women than men. 
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Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) carried out a cross-sectional lab experiment in rural 
Vietnam on participants that had already participated in a household survey, thus being able to 
link risk behavior to demographic and economic variables. They find no significant effect of 
gender on risk aversion. Age and education, however, has a significant positive effect on risk 
aversion, meaning the more educated and the older the participant is, the more risk averse. 
 
Holt and Laurys (2002) famous lab experiment, where they created what has later been 
referred to as a Multiple Price List (MPL) to elicit US university students risk behavior, has 
been replicated by several behavioral economists. The MPL format gives the participants ten 
choices of two different prospects, one relatively risky and one relatively safe, where the 
probabilities differ for each choice. The MPL format use real monetary rewards and the 
participant must choose between the two prospects presented to them. Holt and Laury (2002) 
report from their study significant effect of gender when the payoffs are low, supporting the 
general idea of women being more risk averse. Surprisingly they find that there is no 
significant effect of gender under the high payoff conditions. Holt and Laury (2002) control 
for other socio economic variables such as age, education level, faculty and income, but find 
that only income has a significant (mildly) negative effect on risk behavior. 
  
Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2002) copied Holt and Laury’s (2002) MPL design and executed 
a lab experiment using surveys with real monetary rewards in Denmark on subjects between 
19 and 25. They find no significant evidence that gender affect risk behavior, contradicting 
the general idea that women are more risk averse than men. Neither in the low payoff scheme 
is gender found to have a significant impact when controlling for other socio economic 
variables. However they do find evidence of the importance of socio demographic 
characteristics on risk aversion. Age is found to have a significant negative effect on risk 
aversion. Furthermore, education is found to have a significant positive effect on risk 
aversion, using skilled labor as a proxy for education. Harrison et al. (2002) also find that 
students are more risk averse than non-students.  
 
Galarza (2009) also reproduced Holt and Laury’s (2002) procedure in a laboratory experiment 
amongst small-scale cotton farmers on the Peruvian south cost. In his findings he reports a 
moderate degree of risk aversion amongst the Peruvian cotton farmers. Although reporting a 
12 
  
vaguely more risk averse behavior amongst women than men, he finds no significant effect of 
gender on risk behavior. The only effect of significance on risk behavior was the participants’ 
education level. Peruvian cotton farmers with higher education are found to be less risk 
averse, contradicting both the findings of Tanaka et al. (2010) in Vietnam and Harrison et al. 
(2002) in Denmark. 
 
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman and Sunde (2010) conducted a laboratory experiment with randomly 
drawn adults in Germany to elicit attitudes towards risk. The participants’ in the risk 
experiment were faced with a slightly different choice table than Holt and Laury’s (2002) 
MPL. In Dohmen et al.`s (2010) format, the choice table consists of twenty choices, each 
choice a binary choice between a lottery or a safe amount. The risk experiment was run with 
the intent to investigate whether or not cognitive ability affects risk aversion. Their research 
finds significant evidence that the higher the cognitive ability the lower the risk aversion. In 
their empiric regression model they also control for gender, finding no significant effects. 
 
Akay, Martinsson, Medhin and Trautmann (2009) conducted a similar experiment to the one 
run by Dohmen et al. (2010), in Ethiopia amongst subsistence farmers. Akay et al.`s (2009) 
risk game with Ethiopian farmers finds that more than half the population behaves highly risk 
averse. By comparing their results with similar experiments run with western students, they 
conclude that it is the extreme cases of risk aversion amongst the Ethiopian peasants that are 
the main driving-force for the more risk averse behavior compared to the risk attitudes of the 
western students. They conclude that; “In any case, the data support the view that strong risk 
aversion predominates among the farmers” (Akay et al., 2009, p`10). They control for socio-
economic characteristics, but they find no significant effect of wealth and income on 
Ethiopian peasants risk attitudes. However, they do find health to have a significant effect on 
risk aversion. The poorer the health the more risk averse the participant acts. They find no 
significant evidence of gender differences in risk attitudes. 
 
Deriving out of the literature within experimental economics presented above, there appears 
to be a difference in the findings from experiments conducted in western countries to those 
conducted in underdeveloped countries. The latter finds gender-specific differences in risk 
aversion to a lesser degree. The fairly homogenous sample in the western experiments and the 
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possible publication bias5 indicates the value of further investigation on gender and risk 
aversion. 
 
3.3 Risk Aversion as Poverty Trap 
Risk is an important factor in (almost) every economic decision in life. The importance of risk 
is of even more significance amongst farmers, as their production outcomes are highly 
volatile due to the unpredictable climate. Poor peasants are thus not only vulnerable to 
individual shocks such as injuries, but also to external shocks, like the weather. It is also well 
known within development economics that in many cases poorer peasants in developing 
countries lack formal credit- and insurance institutions. As so elegantly stated by Kanbur and 
Squire (2001, p`205): “The poor suffer from risk because they lack the means to protect 
themselves adequately against it - this is what makes them vulnerable.” 
  
According to the theory of poverty traps with multiple equilibriums within development 
economics, decision-making under risk explains much of the poverty traps we encounter in 
the underdeveloped world. Within the theory of the poverty trap with multiple equilibriums, 
outside shocks may have permanent outcomes either towards a higher level equilibrium and 
thus economic growth, making new investments more attractive, or to a lower level 
equilibrium, pushing the economic actors into a worse-off state. As farmers within the less 
developed world are more vulnerable to economic shocks, the possibility of being pushed 
down to a worse-off state will, according to Barret, Barnet and Skeeds (2008), limit their 
incentives for investments in technologies. Because the consequences of a failing investment 
are more severe for poor people, the poor should be less willing to take risk than the rich. As 
stated by Kanbur and Squire (2001, p`205); “If a contingency occurs, the poor have few assets 
to dispose of in addressing the problem, or the depletion of those assets must plunge them 
further into long-term poverty”. Feder (1980) further claims that risk aversion can explain the 
differences between countries in the adoption to more modern technologies of production. 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) also suggest a link between agents that exhibit higher risk 
                                                
5 There might be a publication bias, implying that results revealing gender differences are more likely published 
than “non-results”. 
14 
  
aversion and lower wealth accumulation. Hence a vicious circle appears; because you are 
poor, you are more risk averse, which again is a hinder for wealth accumulation.	  
 
The theory predicts that a high degree of risk aversion prevents economic actors from 
undertaking investments that may increase the value of production, and hence their 
possibilities of moving out of poverty. When a high percentage of the population are risk 
averse, adoption of new production technology that can improve their production may not 
occur, and the population/country remains within the underdeveloped state. Moscardi and 
Janvry (1977) introduce a “safety-first rule”, which they argue is followed by subsistence 
farmers when basic needs are at risk. They find evidence that poor peasants are more risk 
averse. Kanbur and Squire (2001) states that the problem with risk is that the poorer peasants 
are facing has two dimensions; they continue their low risk activities with the corresponding 
low returns, and they are extremely vulnerable to small negative shocks. 
 
That wealth and risk aversion are correlated is consistent with the Expected Utility Theorem 
and Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion, which postulates that poorer people are less willing 
to take risk. Binswanger (1980), however, finds no significant link between risk aversion and 
wealth. Neither does Tananka et al. (2010). They used an instrumental variable for income, 
and find that neither household income nor village income has an effect on risk aversion. As 
mentioned in section 3.2; Akay et al. (2009) find no effect of wealth, whilst Holt and Laury 
(2002) find income to have a significant effect. Knowledge could also be vital for a better 
understanding of possible rewards from investments. In agriculture, lack of knowledge and 
information of available production technologies is salient. A peasant woman confirmed the 
importance of knowledge; “We produce corn, potatoes and onions. We don't produce quinoa 
anymore. Last year the harvest got sick, and I don't know how to avoid the plagues”. 
Investigating risk aversion amongst low-income farmers is of importance due to its vital 
implication regarding the peasants’ inclination towards undertaking risky but possibly 
rewarding investments. As reducing exposure to risk is introduced as a mean against long-run 
poverty (Kanbur and Squire, 2001), investigating risk behavior is important for possible 
future policy implementation.   
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4 Method 
4.1 Estimation Procedure to Measure Risk 
Behavior 
In order to measure risk aversion amongst poor peasants in rural Peru, I will use the data of a 
one-stage risk experiment. The risk experiment was run in rural Peru, in fifteen communities 
in two regions in the southern highlands, Cusco and Apurimac. The risk experiment is one of 
four experiments run by the research project Land and Gender in Peru, executed by NIBR and 
the Frisch Centre. 
 
Before the experiment, the participants answered a short questionnaire stating how satisfied 
they were with different aspects of their lives, such as marriage, economic situation, health 
etc. The sample consists of the same households that participated in a survey run by NIBR. I 
thus have access to a large variety of data, such as age, income, education, decision power, 
etc. on my subject pool. Some of the data collected from this questionnaire and the survey 
will be used as control variables.  
 
The households were selected at random, based on the criteria that they were a couple 
(married or cohabitants), that they both lived most of the year in the community, that both 
spouses could participate and that they had agricultural land. In total, the experiment was 
conducted with 289 couples, thus 578 individuals. The selection process might create a 
selection bias as the sampling method can be related to the dependent variable (see section 
5.2), risk aversion. Marriage or cohabitation is regarded as more stable and their living 
conditions as more secure, people who choose to marry or cohabit might therefor be of a more 
risk averse character. Harrison et al. (2002) did, for example, find that singles have a higher 
degree of risk aversion than married. Unfortunately I am not able to control for this possible 
bias. 
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We used eight enumerators who speak both Spanish and the local Quechua language, as the 
majority of the participants have Quechua as their mother tongue. The experiment was thus 
conducted in either Spanish or Quechua depending on the participants’ comprehension of 
each of the languages.   	  
 
From the pilots we ran in two other districts, we discovered that several of the participants in 
the pilot were not paying attention to the instructions when read out aloud in front of all the 
participants, and that several of the participants did not show up. We therefore ran the 
experiments with each individual in their own home, to make sure that the participant was 
paying attention to the instructions and that they showed up. In order to keep the anonymity 
and to make sure that their decisions were not influenced by the presence of others (for 
instance their spouse), we emphasized that no other person but the participant and the 
enumerator could be present in the room during the experiment.   
 
As the majority of the participants had low reading skills, and many of them were illiterate, 
the risk game had to be simple and understandable. To avoid any misunderstandings, the 
enumerators explained the game both orally6 and virtually until the participants confirmed 
that they understood the rules.  
 
The participants in the risk game were never presented with the possibility of negative 
payoffs. First of all due to the clearly unethical implications. Secondly, by introducing the 
possibilities of a negative payoff the game might be measuring the participants’ budget 
constraints, and not their attitudes towards risk (Binswanger 1980).  As Binswanger (1980, 
p´396) states “One cannot, in measuring pure attitudes to risk, propose games to individuals 
for which the worst possible loss exceeds their current cash holding”.   
 
 
 
                                                
6 See the instructions of the risk game in Appendix B. 
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4.2 Experimental Procedure/Design 
In order to measure rural Peruvian peasants’ attitudes towards risk, we followed the 
experimental procedure of Akay et al. (2009) conducted in Ethiopia, were they in addition 
measured attitudes towards ambiguity, a setup we also followed. 
 
The experiment is a one-stage game, with twenty choices between a secure amount and a 
lottery7. Appendix A lists all possible choices the participants faced. The probabilities and the 
monetary rewards of the lotteries are kept constant across the decisions rows, where there was 
a 50% probability of winning 10 Soles8 and a 50% probability of winning 0 Soles. The safe 
amount increases by 0,5 Soles for each row, starting with 0,5 Soles until the safe amount 
equaled the high payoff of the lottery. We found each participant´s level of risk aversion by 
marking their first safe choice. A lower safe choice represents a higher level of risk aversion 
(see table 1, section 4.3). According to expected utility theorem, rational behavior implies 
choosing the lottery for small safe amounts, and then to switch to safe option at some point.  
 
In the beginning of the experiment the participants were shown a brown bag consisting of ten 
poker-chips; five red and five blue. They were then asked to choose a color, and explained 
that if they chose the risky option, they would earn ten Soles only if the chip they were to 
draw have the same color as the chosen color, if not they would earn zero. If the participant 
for instance chose the poker-chip with the color red, and the chip he/she draws from the 
brown bag is blue, he/she walks away from the game without any reward. 
 
They were then presented with the choice of fifty centimos for sure or the possibility of 
earning ten Soles if they were to draw the poker chip with their chosen color. The safe pot 
increased step by step with fifty centimos at a time, until the participant chose the safe 
amount. The participant was then asked if she/he wanted the safe amount for the rest of the 
options, up on till the amount in the safe pot equaled the possible payoff of the risky option 
                                                
7 As shown in Apendix B, the experiment consisted of both a risky prospect and an ambiguous prospect – with a 
total of 40 choices. However, only the outcomes of the risky prospect are of concern here. 
 
8 10 Soles is approximately equal to 3,6 US $ and equals approximately half a day unskilled labor wage.   
18 
  
(ten Soles). If yes, the secure option was marked for the rest of the options. If no, the 
experimenter continued increasing the secure amount fifty centimos at a time. 
 
In total the participants were presented with twenty choices in the risk game. They were 
explained that only one of the choices was to be paid9. Which of the choices that was to be 
realized would be decided at random by the drawings of a stack of cards, each card 
representing one of the choices. According to Dohmen et al. (2010) “This procedure gives 
subjects an incentive to choose according to their true preferences in each row, and thus is 
incentive compatible”. 
  
4.3 Certainty Equivalent and Risk Aversion  
Each participant’s degree of risk aversion is measured by looking at his or her first switch 
from the risky choice to the safe, !!. The participants’ certainty equivalent is the value of the 
secure amount,  !!, where the subject is indifferent between choosing the risky option or the 
safe amount. But if the participant switches at 4 Soles it is impossible to know the exact 
switching point, it can be anywhere between 3,5 Soles to 4 Soles. The participants’ certainty 
equivalent is therefore calculated as the mean between the last safe option and the first safe 
choice. In the risk game the participant has a total of 20 choices. As before let !! be your first 
safe choice,	  !! can take any value within the interval [0.5 , 10]. The participants’ certainty 
equivalent (CE) is then 
(2.11) !" =   !! − 0,25  
 
The agents’ attitudes towards risk can now be deduced from the agents’ choices in the risk 
game. The degree of risk aversion,  !, is derived from the subjects’ certainty equivalent. At this 
value the subjects expected utility of the two choices must be equal, EUᵧ= EUᵩ, from (2.9) 
and (2.10) replacing !! with CE from equation (2.11), we then get: 
 
                                                
9 One of the forty choices made in both prospects, see footnote 8  
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(2.12) !"(!!!)!!! = !! !!!!!!!! + 1−   !! !!!!!!!!  
 
From equations (2.12), and the now known probabilities !!, (1-!!), the certainty equivalent, 
CE,  and the value of the two states of the world !! ,  !! , one can solve for    !. Inserting for the 
known values of !! = 0  , !! = 10,  and !!= (1-!!), =  1 2, 
 
(2.13) ! = !"(! !)!"(!")!!"(!")  
 
The participants degree of risk aversion can now be derived from equation (2.13) by inserting 
his/hers choice of !!. 
	  
In table 1 all possible options are listed, with their corresponding monetary value, !!  and CE. 
In table 1 I have also listed the CRRA coefficient associated with,  !, and equivalent risk 
aversion label following the same labeling as Akay et al. (2009). The following coefficient of 
risk aversion,  !, can be meassured for each choice by comparing the CE for each choice to the 
expected value of the risky choice. Level of risk aversion,  !, for each choice is derived from 
equation (2.13).   
                      Table  1.   CRRA  coefficients  
	  
	  
First  Safe  Choice   !!    CE   !   Risk  Aversion  [1  ,  2]   [0.5  ,  1]   [0.25  ,  0.75]   [0.81  ,  0.73]   Highly  Risk  Averse  [3  ,  6]   [1.5  ,  3]   [1.25  ,  2.75]   [0.67  ,  0.46]     Risk  Averse  [7  ,  9]   [3.5  ,  4.5]   [3.25  ,  4.25]   [0.38  ,  0.19]   Mildly  Risk  Averse  [10  ,  ∞)   [5  ,  ∞)   [4.75  ,  ∞)   [0.07  ,  -­‐∞)   Risk  Neutral/Loving    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
                
Note:  The  table  depicts  the  level  of  risk  aversion  connected  with  the  participants’  first  safe  choice.	  Numbers	  are	  rounded.  
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From the expected utility theory the lottery has an expected payoff equal to 1 2 0+1 2 10 = 5 Soles. A high density of first safe choice around !! = 5 Soles, implying risk 
neutrality, is thus expected.  
   
The assumption of constant relative risk aversion is not necessarily a problem free 
assumption. Several scholars within experimental research have approached this, and there is 
now a growing body of empiric research with evidence against the CRRA assumption. 
 
Harrison et al. (2002) experiment in Denmark, found significant evidence that risk attitudes 
changes from risk averse to risk loving, when the monetary reward of the risky choice 
increases. Binswanger (1980) also concludes in his findings that risk behavior depends on the 
payoff. The tendency that risks behavior changes when payoffs are scaled up or down is 
clearly inconsistent with the constant relative risk aversion assumption. 
 
However, Croson and Gneezy (2009) suggest in their paper that the value of the prize is not of 
importance when investigating the effect of gender on risk aversion. They refer to 
experimental studies with higher stakes that also find gender difference in risk taking, 
supporting the theory of constant relative risk aversion. Furthermore, within the small payoff 
interval in the risk game [0.5 , 10] Soles, I would argue that risk aversion is constant. For this 
reason and simplicity I will continue with the CRRA assumption. 
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5  Results and Discussion 
5.1 Non-Standard Behavior 
According to expected utility theory, consistent behavior in our game, where only the safe 
amount increases, implies only one switching point. In other words, once the participant has 
chosen the safe amount, it is considered inconsistent and irrational to switch back to the 
lottery. If the participant chose the safe amount, at say 3 Soles, it would be irrational to then 
later in the game choose the lottery, as the safe amount is now a higher, whilst the expected 
outcome of the lottery is unchanged. This special form of behavior is in the literature often 
referred to as multiple switching behavior, MSB (see Galazara, 2009).   
 
I have excluded all observations where the participants’ show MSB, reducing the sample size 
from 578 to 560 individuals. Though this behavior is irrational according to expected utility 
theory, it might also be an expression of indifference towards risk until a certain value. As one 
of the women said during the risk game; “until 5 I want to take some risk and some secure 
choices”, expressing indifference but not perfunctoriness. Nonetheless, it still makes it 
difficult to deduce their correct certainty equivalents, thus excluding these observations is 
necessary.   
 
There are also participants’ who chose the risky option throughout all the game. This behavior 
is irrational, as stated by the expected utility theory. These observations will be categorized as 
first safe option equal to 21, and a certainty equivalent equal to 10,25. The corresponding 
monetary payoff from the safe amount, γ, is equal to 10 Soles. At this row, you cannot win 
more than the safe amount; hence there are no monetary rewards for the lottery when the safe 
amount is 10 Soles. According to expected utility theory, even the most risk loving person 
should choose the safe option at this point.  
 
This extreme version of risk loving behavior is also clearly gender-specific. As shown in table 
2, 85 % of the participants who choose the risky choice when there are no monetary rewards 
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connected with this choice, the “no switchers”, are men. Hence, the irrational risk loving 
behavior is clearly male biased. 
 Table  2.   "No  Switchers"  and  Gender  
   First  Safe  Choice             Gender  Total*   Men             Women  4  %   20   85%   17   15%   3  Note:  Frequence  and  percentage  of  the  "no  switchers"  by  gender     *Percentage  of  "no  switchers"  of  all  participants.  Numbers	  are	  rounded.        
 
Other researchers also find this irrational behavior, and the common solution is to exclude 
these observations in the analysis. However, the behavior of the “no switchers” is still, in my 
opinion, a result of extreme risk loving preferences, and not because of low understanding of 
the game. The game was, as mentioned in chapter 4, designed to make sure that everyone 
were able to understand as much as possible, where each enumerator explained the procedure 
until they believed that the participant had understood. The enumerators were of the opinion 
that the “no switchers” had understood the game just as well as the other participants. A 
former merchant, now a highland peasant in Cusco, explained his “no switching” behavior by 
a preference for risk; “I want the risky option because I don’t like to earn money the easy 
way. I always go for the risky option, never the safe, here and in real life. My motto is; if it 
goes bad, try again.” Hence, this behavior should not be characterized as more abnormal than 
the participation in other forms of gambles just for the thrill in itself. As this behavior appears 
to be just as well thought out as the behavior of the other participants, it will not be excluded. 
 
 
5.2 Sampling Characteristics 
The sample population consists of couples that are either married or cohabiting from the rural 
areas in the southern highlands of Peru, with the majority having Quechua as their mother 
tongue. After excluding the individuals with MSB, as explained in section 5.1, the sample 
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consists of 560 individuals. The participants vary in age, all within the age range 20 till 88 
years old, with the mean age being 46 years old. 
 
The major economic activities in the highlands are agriculture and animal breeding. Around 
90% of the sample report either agriculture or breeding of animals as their main economic 
activity (see table 3). As can be read from table 3, 6% of the sample lists “paid labor” 
(agricultural/animal breeding laborer, transportation, trade, mining, handicrafts and other 
services in general) as their main economic activity. Only 3 % of the sample, all being 
women, lists housework as their principal activity.  
 
The labor market is also highly gender segregated, in which women are mainly responsible 
for the breeding of animals whilst men are responsible for the plots. Approximately 92% of 
the men list agriculture as their main activity, whilst only 33 % of the women regard this 
activity as principal (see table 3). Having said that, as much 58% of the women report 
agriculture as their secondary activity10. The gender segregation is even more obvious when 
we look at the breeding of animals. Only 1 participant of the male sample considers animal 
breeding as his main activity, whilst the majority of the women (54%) list this activity as their 
main activity. As a 28 years old woman from the Peruvian highlands stated, it is often the man 
who acts as the responsible economic actor within the household; “It is the woman who is the 
caretaker of animals, whilst the husband is responsible for the crops. They both make the 
decisions regarding animals together. However, it is the husband alone who makes all the 
decision regarding their plots, which crops to produce, the use of fertilizers and pesticides, 
and whether or not to sell the production.”   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 It should be noted that the rational behind that women to a lesser extent report agriculture as their main 
economic activity, might be because the contributions by women in agriculture is not regarded as equally 
valuable to the contribution of men, even though the time spent on agricultural work might be similar. 
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Table  3.   Economic  Activity  
     Main  Economic  Activity   Male   Female   Total       Freq.   Percent   Freq.   Percent   Freq.   Percent  Agriculture   257   92  %   93   33  %   350   63  %  Animal  breeding   1   0  %   150   54  %   151   27  %  Housework   0   0  %   19   7%   19   3  %  Paid  Labor     21   8  %   12   4  %   33   6  %  Other   0   0  %   5   2  %   5   1  %  Total   279   100  %   279   100  %   558   100%          Note:  Main  economic  activity  reported  by  gender.  2  missing  observations  on  principal  activity.  Numbers	  are	  rounded.	                 
The majority of the sample have not finished secondary school, and as much as 57% of the 
sample have not even completed primary school; equivalent to 6 years of schooling (see table 
4).  There is also an obvious difference in the distribution in education with respect to gender, 
demonstrated in table 5. Furthermore, there is a fairly big difference in gender that reports 
higher level of education (secondary or higher). More than half as many men as women report 
higher levels of education, respectively 17% of male sample as opposed to 6 % of the women. 
Gender is also significantly (at a 1% level) correlated with education; there is a negative 
relationship between women and education.  
  Table  4.   Level  of  Education  
Level  of   Gender   Total  Education   Male   Female  <  Primary   133   48  %   184   65  %   317   57  %  <  Secondary   98   35  %   80   28  %   178   32  %  Higher   48   17  %   17   6  %   65   12  %  Total   279   100  %   281   100  %   560   100  %  Note:  Reported  education  level.  <  Primary  signify  that  the        participant  has  not  finished  primary  school  (6  years  of  schooling),          <  secondary  signify  that  the  participant  has  not  finished  secondary  school.  And  higher  indicates  all  education  above,        including  finished  secondary.  Numbers	  are	  rounded.         
   
There is also a strikingly huge difference between the two genders, looking at the variables 
capturing the participants’ literacy and mathematical ability. Only 14% of the men are not able 
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to read, in contrast to 40 % of the women (see table 5). Looking at the samples mathematical 
skills11 the same pattern appears. Far less women than men are able to perform a simple 
multiplication correctly. Whilst about 27 % of the population is illiterate, almost half the 
population, 49%, is not able to solve the mathematical problem. The highlands of Peru have 
however experienced a great improvement in the investments in education the last decade. 
The percentage of illiterate is clearly decreasing with age, as demonstrated by table 6, the 
number of illiterate decrease from 46% to 9% when we move from the oldest age group to the 
lowest (from above the age 50 to the age group under 30). This tendency is not as clear when 
looking at math skills. Yet, the difference between the oldest and the youngest age group is 
fairly big, where as much as just under 66% of the age group 50 and above are not able to 
solve a simple mathematical problem, as opposed to 37% of the age group under 30, 
illustrated by the same table. A local schoolteacher confirms this; “When I started working as 
a schoolteacher 13 years ago, it was different. Almost none of the children in the village went 
to school, especially not the girls. The general idea was that girls were to get married at the 
age of 16, so why invest in their education? Now almost all the children attend school. There 
are even people living here with higher education, there are two engineers and some nurses”. 
According to the schoolteacher, the reason for this change is the road connecting the village to 
the outside world; “The villagers could now see how others are living, which made them want 
to improve their own situation. They also had better possibilities of getting paid jobs outside 
of the village. And when the fathers saw that other children were getting education, they also 
wanted their children to attend school”. 
 Table  5.   Literacy,  Mathematical  Ability  and  Gender  
 Variable   Gender            Male   Female   Total       Freq.   Percent   Freq.   Percent   Freq.   Percent  Read   239   86  %   168   60  %   407   73  %  Mathskills   177   63  %   108   38  %   285   51  %  Note:  Table  depicting  literacy  and  math  skills  (able  to  solve  a  simple  math  problem),  the  respective  frequencies  and  percentage  by  gender.  Numbers	  are	  rounded.            
 
                                                
11 Math skill is measured by the participants’ ability to calculate 5*6.  
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 Table  6.  Literacy,  Mathematical  Ability  and  Age  
 Variable   Read     Mathskills  Age  group   Freq.   Percent   Total   Freq.   Percent   Total  >30   52   91%   57   36   63%   57  30-­‐39   137   83%   166   93   56%   166  40-­‐49   116   78%   148   91   61%   148  <50   102   54%   189   65   34%   189  Total   407   73%   560   285   51%   560  Note:  Table  demonstrating  literacy  and  mathematical  ability    within  the  different  age  groups.	  Numbers	  are	  rounded.            
The measurement of income that I will use stems from the income data based on households’ 
own estimation of how much income each individual generates through each economic 
activity. The couple estimated share of total household income generated by each economic 
activity, and then each member`s relative contribution to each activity. Hence, the income 
measure used is measuring the monetary value of the individuals’ total contribution to the 
income production within the household. Only a minority of the households in the subject 
pool have a salary based income, it is thus likely that their concept of exact income is fairly 
low, making my income variable a highly subjective and not very precise estimate. Though it 
is an imprecise estimate, it does however give a fairly good picture of the living standard 
amongst the Peruvian peasant sample. As figure 2 depicts, the peak is at an annual income 
less than 1000 Soles (equal to approximately 355 US $), furthermore 75 % of the population 
in both regions reports an annual income of less than 8000 Soles (2846 US $), suggesting that 
the majority is quite poor. However there is a difference in income distribution between the 
two regions, with the participants’ in Cusco reporting a higher density of farmers reporting an 
extremely low annual income; less than 1000 Soles (see figure 2). In Cusco as much as 18 % 
of the population has an annual reported income less than 1000 Soles, as opposed to only 5 % 
in Apurimac. 
 
There are also differences in income within a region. The income spread is wider in Cusco, 
where the income reported lies within the bound [0 , 55800] Soles, distinguished from the 
range bound reported in Apurimac; [0 , 39690] Soles. Incomes in Cusco, for instance, vary up 
to 55800 Soles annually, whilst the median income is as little as 3400 Soles annually, and 75 
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% of the sample report less than or equal to 6804 Soles a year. Cusco also has one extreme 
outlier; one of the participants’ reports an annual income of 15120012 Soles. The same 
tendency of variations within the region also applies for Apurimac, though not as great as 
Cusco. 
 
Local sources also suggest that there is a geographical difference in income. The Villages are 
located at a high altitude between 3000 – 3500 meters above sea level. Plots located at a 
higher altitude tend to be smaller. As a 32 years old man from one of the districts located at a 
higher altitude explained; “Most of what we produce here is for our own consumption; corn, 
potatoes, quinoa etc. Our plots are too small to compete with the larger producers, so crop 
production is not very rewarding. We also have animals, a pig, a cow, and some guinea pigs. 
But for most peasants here, these are for our own consumption. What would be rewarding 
would be to breed animals for sale. But as we are not accustomed to breed animals on a large 
scale, none of us do.”  Even though there are variations in income, the majority of the 
population in question is extremely poor farmers, with around 80 % valuing their income 
generating activities as less than 9000 Soles a year (approximately equal to 3201 US $). 
	  
Figure	  2.	  Reported	  annual	  income	  in	  the	  two	  districts,	  Cusco	  and	  Apurimac 
 
                                                
12 This outlier is excluded from this discussion on income and from figure 2. However, it is not excluded from 
the regression analysis in section 5.5, see footnote 17 
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Note:  Cusco:  median  =  3400  S/.  annually  ,  25th  Percentile  =  1586  S/.,  75th  percentile  6804  S/.  Range  [0  ,  55800].  Apurimac:  median=  4303  S/.  ,  25th  =2086  S/.,  75th=7600  S/.,  Range  [0  ,  39690]  
Women have less income than men, significant at a 1 % level, as demonstrated in figure 3. 
The median annual income reported by men equals 4800 Soles, as contrasted with the median 
income reported by women; 3030 Soles annually. The income spread is also smaller for 
women than men, respectively [0 , 31063] [0 , 47380] Soles, suggesting smaller differences 
within the female population.  
 
     Figure  3.   Income  Distribution  by  Gender  
 Note:  Male:  median  =  4800  Soles  annually,  25th  Percentile  =  2400  S/.,  75th  percentile  9117  S/.  Range  bound  [0  ,  47380]    Outlier  151  200.  Women:  median=  3030  S/.  ,  25th  =1486%,  75th=5875,  Range  bound  [0  ,  31063],  outlier  55800  
 
The absolute income measure gives an indication of the samples’ purchasing power. Your 
behavior is, however, affected not only by your income but also by your income relative to 
those around you and your aspirations. The variable economic satisfaction is based on the 
question “How satisfied are you with your economic situation on a scale from 1-10?”, and the 
participants answer is labeled as “not satisfied” if the answer is in the interval [1-3], 
“satisfied” if the answer falls within the interval [4-6] and “very satisfied” for all answers 
within the interval [7-10]. Surprisingly, considering the population in question, the majority is 
satisfied with their economic situation (see table 7). Even more surprising is the result that 
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remarkably more of the farmers report to be “very satisfied” (38%) than “not satisfied” (10%) 
with their economic situation, as demonstrated in table 7. 
 Table  7.   Economic  Satisfaction  
 Satisfied  With   Total  Economic  Situation   Freq.   Percent   Cum.  Not  Satisfied   55   10  %   9,82  Satisfied   291   52  %   61.79  Very  Satisfied   214   38  %   100.00  Total   560   100  %       Note:  Reported  satisfaction  with  own  personal  economic  situation.  Numbers	  are	  rounded.  
 
As shown in table 8, there is no apparent link between economic satisfaction and reported 
income. Farmers with a low annual income13 are not less satisfied with their economic 
situation. Only 12 % of those with an annual income less than 1000 Soles are not satisfied, 
whilst 26 % of the same group reports to be very satisfied with their private economy. 
 Table  8.  Economic  Satisfaction  and  Income  
 Level  of    Economic  Satisfaction  Income*   Not   Satisfied   Very  Satisfied  0-­‐1000   12%   62%   26%  1001-­‐2000   11%   52%   36%  2001-­‐3000   12%   45%   42%  3001-­‐4000   11%   48%   41%  4001-­‐5000   9%   62%   30%  5001-­‐6000   10%   46%   44%  6001-­‐7000   10%   41%   48%  7001-­‐8000   6%   52%   42%  8001-­‐9000   11%   37%   53%  9001-­‐56000   6%   55%   39%  151200   0%   100%   0%  Note:  Economic  satisfaction  of  the  participants  sorted  by  income  group  *Reported  yearly  income  in  Soles.	  Numbers	  are	  rounded.         
                                                
13 Income is still measured by the monetary value of the individuals’ production within the household. 
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Our sample is as well in general feeling healthy. As displayed in table 9, the majority of the 
observations report a fair or good health, and there are more observations reporting a good or 
excellent health than a poor or very poor health (respectively 38% and 29%). More interesting 
is the gender difference in health. Looking at the gender specific numbers in table 9, we find 
that the percentage of women reporting a poor health is higher than for men, and that a higher 
percentage of men report to have a good health.   
 Table  9.   Health  and  Gender  
    Health   Male   Female   Total  Freq.        Freq.   Percent   Freq.   Percent   Cum.  Very  Poor   4   1  %   13   5  %   17   3  %   3  %  Poor   63   23  %   84   30  %   147   26  %   29  %  Fair   90   32  %   95   34  %   185   33  %   62  %  Good   114   41  %   83   30  %   197   35  %   98  %  Excellent   8   3  %   6   2  %   14   3  %   100  %  Total   279   100  %   281   100  %   560   100  %       Note:  Reported  personal  health.    Numbers	  are	  rounded.               
 
5.3 Experimental Results 
I have also compared the risk attitudes of our sample with the attitudes towards risk from 
other samples in other countries. In table 9 below I have added the risk attitudes from our 
sample to Akay et al.`s (2009) table 1. In their table 1, they report the risk attitudes found 
amongst Ethiopian peasants by Akay et al. (2009), amongst Dutch students by Trautmann et 
al. (2009) and amongst U.S students by Holt and Laury (2002). The risk games executed in 
Ethiopia and the Netherlands are equivalent to our experimental design. Holt and Laury 
(2002) conduct a slightly different experiment (see section 3.2), but the results are comparable 
to our results. 
 
Above half the population in our sample, 52% to be exact, exhibit a high degree of risk 
aversion with a !  > 0,68. This result fits well with the theory discussed earlier; poorer 
populations’ exhibit to a larger degree extreme risk aversion (without discussing the 
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causality). The result resembles the findings from Ethiopia by Akay et al. (2009). The amount 
of observations with a risk averse attitude, 0,41 < ! ≤ 0,68, is also quite similar to our sample. 
When it comes to a degree of risk aversion of ! ≤ 0,41 (mildly risk averse to risk loving), 
peasants from the Peruvian highlands have a larger share of the population being risk neutral 
or risk loving, than the Ethiopian sample. The Ethiopian sample have a higher density of 
observations in the mildly risk averse group, compared to our sample. 
 
Looking at the western student sample, the differences between the US student sample and the 
Dutch are more apparent than the similarities. Only 1 % of the Dutch sample demonstrates a 
highly risk averse behavior, compared to 39% of the US sample. Both Peruvian and Ethiopian 
participants do however show a notably higher percentage of the population being highly risk 
averse than the US student sample. 
 Table  9.   Distribution  of  CRRA  coefficients  in  four  different  experimental  studies  
   Risk  Game  Samples   Risk  Neutral/  Loving   Mildly  Risk  Averse   Risk  Averse   Highly  Risk  Averse       ρ  ≤  0,15   0,15  <  ρ  ≤  0,41   0,41  <  ρ  ≤  0,68   ρ  >  0,68  Peruvian  farmers  (n=560)   30  %   5  %   13  %   52  %  Ethiopian  farmers  (n=92)*   22  %   11  %   10  %   58  %  Dutch  students  (n=79)*   19  %   35  %   44  %   1  %  U.S.  students  (n=93)*     19  %   19  %   23  %   39  %                          Note:  Comparing  risk  attitudes  found  amongst  the  participants  in  our  sample  to  the  risk  attitudes  found  by  Akay et  al.  (2009),  Trautmann  et  al.  (2009)  and  Holt  and  Laury  (2002).  *  Reported  in  Akay  et  al.  (2009)  table  1.	  Numbers	  are	  rounded.   	                    
Furthermore, both the Ethiopian and the Peruvian sample show few observations within the 
more conservative range; mildly risk averse and risk averse. The majority of the sample is 
within the more extreme categories; highly risk averse and risk neutral to risk loving. 
Amongst the peasants in the Peruvian sample only 18% of the participants behave in a risk 
averse to a mildly risk averse manner. The western student samples, on the other hand, have a 
higher density in the more conservative range. This difference in risk aversion indicates that 
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there is a truth in the theory's prediction that there is a correlation between poverty and risk 
aversion. Whether it is poverty that affects risk attitudes or risk attitudes that affects poverty is 
still not answered. One possible reason for the high degree of extreme risk aversion amongst 
Peruvian peasants could be a low understanding of the probabilities, and a low comprehension 
of the choices, due to lower mathematical skills. 
 
Figure 4 shows histograms of first safe choice for all participants by gender. In section 4.3 I 
expected to find a high density of first safe choice around option 10, with a safe amount, γ!, 
equal to 5 Soles implying risk neutrality. However, though there is some clustering at this 
point, it is clearly not the peak. As displayed in figure 4, the peak for both women and men is 
for first safe choice = 1, with the corresponding safe amount, γ!, = 0,5 Soles. The peak is 
higher for women than men, implying that more women than men choose the safe amount at 
option 1. The distribution is skewed to the left, indicating that the participants’ first safe chose 
is at low values of the safe option. There is also a fairly high density of men that never 
chooses the safe amount (in figure 4, this behavior is demonstrated by a first safe choice = 
21). 
 Figure  4.   Risk  Aversion  by  Gender  
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5.4 Econometric Model and Specification 
The econometric model I will analyze is:  
!.!       !"#$  !"#$%&'!! =  ∝ +!!!"#$%!! + !!!"#$%"&!!!!!! + !! 
 
This model captures the effect of gender on risk behavior amongst our sample in the southern 
Peruvian highlands. The footnote i denotes the specific participant, ∝ is the constant term, !! 
the coefficient capturing the effect of gender (being a woman) on risk aversion, !! the 
coefficient capturing the effect of my control variables and !! the error term capturing all the 
variations the controls or gender did not explain. Model (M.B) below is the same as (M.A) 
only I have here specified the controls in (M.B); 
 !.!     !"#$  !"#$%&'!! =  ∝ +!!!"#$%!! + !!!"#$%&'!! + !!!"!! + !!!"#$%ℎ! + !!!"#ℎ  !"#$!"!+ !!!"#$%&"'#$()  !"#ℎ  !"#!"#$%  !"#$%#"&'! + !!!"#$%$#&'(  !"#$%!!+ !!!"#"$  !"  !"!"#$%&'! + !!!!!! !!"#  !"#$%$#!!" + !! 
 
In order to investigate the gender effect on risk aversion amongst Peruvian peasants I will use 
the Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS). All of the estimations are done by the use of 
STATA11. The sample consists, as mentioned earlier, of individuals in a couple; hence it is 
natural to assume that some of the responses of the one partner are correlated with his/her 
partners’ response. To control for possible correlated data, to make sure my standard errors are 
correct, I will cluster on the household ID.  
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“Risk Aversion” is my dependent variable. “Risk Aversion” is the inverse of the participants’ 
first safe choice amongst the twenty options, its switching point to the safe amount. A low 
switching point implies a low certainty equivalent and risk aversion. And a high switching 
point implies a high certainty equivalent and a less risk averse behavior. 
 
Gender is my explanatory variable, coded as a [0/1] dummy with female as the indicator. I 
will also add controls to examine whether there is a direct relationship (if my hypothesis 
holds) between gender and risk aversion, or if the apparent possible relationship is merely 
capturing other effects such as income or education. 
 
I will include a region dummy to control for demographic variations in the sample as the 
experiments were run in two different regions. As other scholars have suggested from their 
experimental results, behavior is contextual and demographically dependent, thus by 
including a region dummy I can control for regional differences. The dummy is coded [0/1] 
with Apurimac as the indicator. 
 
I will also control for other socio-economic variables that might affect risk aversion, and 
which my explanatory variable gender otherwise would capture. I will not investigate the 
causality relation between these variables and risk aversion. 
 
Individual income is one of the control variables I will include. Previous studies have, as 
reported in chapter 3, found income and wealth to have an effect on risk aversion. The richer 
you are, the more you can bear to loose in a pursuit of more income. Hence I expect a 
negative effect of income on risk aversion. As also commented in section 3.3, it is plausible 
that risk aversion is a decreasing function of income.  
 
I will also include the variable “Satisfaction with Economic Situation” which is, as explained 
in the previous section, a measure of satisfaction with their economic situation. As discussed 
earlier, there is no apparent link between income and economic satisfaction. One should thus 
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suspect that satisfaction with economic situations is just as important when investigating 
behavior towards risk. 
 
Education has also been found to be of importance when eliciting risk behavior, and is 
therefore included as a control variable. From the existing literature, see chapter 3, it is 
difficult to predict what effect education might have on risk aversion. There is also a vast 
difference in education level between the majority of the populations investigated in the 
above-mentioned experiments and the population studied here. The level of education is fairly 
low (see in section 5.2). As commented in section 3.3, lack of knowledge could lead the 
participant to act in a more risk averse manner. Higher level of education might also be 
necessary to have a sufficient concept and understanding of risk and probabilities. On the 
other hand, the participants were fully informed, which according to basic economic theory, is 
one of the lead assumptions that needs to be fulfilled for economic actors to be able to 
undertake rational decisions. I will include the variable “Level of Education” to control for 
the level of education. 
 
I will not control for literacy, as literacy is (not surprisingly) collinear with education level. It 
can thus be dropped as the variable education contains almost the same information. 
 
I will also include the variable for mathematical skill “Math skills”, discussed in section 5.2. 
Mathematical ability can have an effect on the participants’ ability to understand the game and 
a participant with math skill could thus be expected to make a better possible choice. As 
already shown section 5.2, there is a huge gender-specific difference in mathematical ability.  
 
The participants’ health and its age could also be of significance when investigating risk 
behavior. Health can, in the same ways as income and wealth, affect the participants’ 
possibility set. To control for health, I have included the variable “Health”, stemming from a 
question “How would you describe your health on a scale from 1 to 6, 1 being very poor and 
6 being excellent”. I will also control for age. 
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The work sphere is highly gender segregated, and it is plausible that the participants’ main 
activity has an effect on risk behavior. Working in agriculture is, for instance, related with a 
lot of risk, whilst housework is not associated with uncertain outcomes to the same extent. 
Thus, it would be expected that a person with agriculture as main economic activity exhibit a 
lower level of risk aversion than a person who has housework as his/her principal activity. 
Although animal breeding is not identified with a lot of risk, high scale livestock production is 
considered as a smart investment with future payoffs. Hence participants working with animal 
breeding might be more accustomed to consider the possible payoffs of different choices. 
Participants working as paid laborer has a salary-based income that is a more secure 
livelihood, thus it should be associated with a more risk averse behavior. However, in the two 
regions in the rural highlands of Peru, paid labor is unconventional. Thus participants earning 
a wage might be those who “think outside the box” in order to rise their standard of living, a 
quality not connected with highly risk averse behavior. 4 dummy variables referring to the 
different activities are included in the model, with agriculture as the reference group.  
“Animals as Main Activity” is the dummy for animal breeding as main activity; “Paid Labor 
as Main Activity” is the dummy for paid labor, “Housework as Main Activity” for housework 
as main activity and “Other Main Activity” is the dummy for other, non-specified activity.  
 
I find no reason to worry about my explanatory variables being highly correlated. None of the 
variables included in model (M.B) have a high correlation. The largest correlation coefficient, 
equal to 0,5067 significant at a 1% level, is (not so surprising) between level of education and 
math skill, where education is positively correlated with mathematical ability. Stock and 
Watson (2007) rule for problematic multicollinearity is a correlation coefficient larger than 
0,8, which none of my correlation coefficient comes close to. The problem with independent 
variables with a collinear property is that this will lead to over estimation of the estimated 
results. Strictly correlated variables thus lead to misleading conclusions. 
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5.5 Results and Discussion 
I will in this section investigate my hypothesis; 
Peasant women in rural Peruvian highlands are more risk averse than men. 
 
The first model (1) in table 10 regresses the dependent variable, Risk Aversion, on the 
independent [0/1] gender dummy (Female).  
 
(M1)     !"#$  !"#$%&'!! =  ∝ +!!!"#$%!! + !!, where i=1, … 560  
 
Model (1) finds empiric evidence, significant at a 5% significance level14 with a p-value equal 
0,0225, that gender does affect risk behavior in our sample in the rural Peruvian highlands. If 
the participant is a woman, her predicted first safe choice is 1,150 less than her male 
counterpart. In other words, women switch from the risky choice to the safe choice before 
men in our sample in the rural Peruvian highlands. Hence women in our sample are 
significantly more risk averse than men, !! ≠ 0. My finding supports the general idea that 
women are more risk averse than men. There is thus no significant evidence that a gender 
difference in risk aversion is a phenomenon particularly found amongst western students. The 
adjusted R-square is reported to be only 0,0083. The adjusted R-square is a measure of how 
much of the total variation in risk aversion that can be explained by the included variables 
after having adjusted for the amount of degrees of freedom. However, I am only investigating 
if there are gender-specific differences with respect to risk aversion, thus I will not focus on 
the adjusted R-square.  
 
In model (2) I have included 7 of the 8 control variables, see second column in table 10; 
 
                                                
14That a variable is significant at a 5% level means that there is less than 5% probability that we wrongly reject 
the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is equal to zero.  
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(M2)      !"#$  !"#$%&'!! =  ∝ +!!!"#$%!! + !!!"#$%&'!! + !!!"!! + !!!"#$%ℎ! +!!!"#ℎ  !"#$!"! + !!!"#$%&"'#$()  !"#ℎ  !"#!"#$%  !"#$%#"&'! + !!!"#$%!"#$%  !"#$%!! +!!!"#"$  !"  !"!"#$%&'! + !! ,    i=1, … 560.  
 
The gender dummy is still negative and significant at a 5 % significance level, hence gender-
specific differences in risk aversion was not capturing the effect of these included controls on 
risk aversion. Thus my hypothesis still cannot be rejected at a 5 % significance level, peasant 
Peruvian women in our sample are significantly more risk averse than men.  
 
The [0/1] region dummy Apurimac, has a significant effect on risk aversion at a 5% 
significance level, with a p-value=0,0249. A participant from Apurimac is predicted to be 
making the switch towards the safe amount 1,239 choices before a participant from Cusco; 
hence a participant from Apurimac is estimated to be more risk averse than a participant from 
Cusco. This finding supports the statement that risk behavior is culture conditioned.  
 
Economic satisfaction also has a significant, negative effect at a 10% significance level on 
risk aversion. In other words, the more content the participant is with his/her economic 
situation-either with respect to his/her aspirations or compared to the economic situation of 
other- the less risk averse he or she is. How rich you feel and/or your aspirations are of 
significant importance when the participant makes a decision regarding risk.  
 
Model (2) finds no significant effect of the other included control variables, health, age15, 
math skill, income and education on risk	  attitudes. The insignificance of mathematical ability 
indicates that participants with a better understanding of mathematics do not choose 
significantly different from those with a lower concept.  
 
                                                
15 With reference to investments in agriculture, the advantage of experience (which comes with age) will most 
probably not give you an upper hand with respect to returns on a possible investment. The loss in muscle mass 
and generally lower health will most certainly be a disadvantage, and might be a disincentive to invest.  
However, this discussion is beyond the purpose of this thesis, and will thus not be pursued further  
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Although individual income has as expected a negative effect on risk aversion, neither this 
variable is found to have a significant effect16, nor does income affect the significance of 
gender on risk behavior. The decreasing absolute risk aversion and the expected utility 
theorem (see section 3.3) postulates that the poorer the farmer the higher the risk aversion. As 
men in our sample report a higher annual income than women one should expect to find that 
women are less inclined to undertake risky choices because of an income difference. The 
insignificance of income might be a reflection of couple’s tendency towards considering 
household income, and not necessarily individual income, when making economic decisions. 
As the participants are couples where both partners participate in the risk experiment, the 
remaining significance of gender is thus not as surprising. However, a person with more 
economic resources has less economic hinders to undertake a risk in the pursuit of a higher 
monetary reward, whilst the lack of significance of the income variable in model (2) suggests 
that there is no link between income and risk aversion. The lack of significant result of 
income on risk aversion can be due to measurement difficulties. As pointed out in section 5.2, 
income is measured by the participants’ subjective monetary value of their production; this 
measurement might not be sufficient to estimate the effect of income on risk aversion. Given 
that the measurement of income is correct, the lack of significance, combined with the 
significant effect of economic satisfaction17, might also indicate that aspirations or satisfaction 
with private economy is a better measure when investigating risk aversion. That it is how poor 
you feel and/or your aspirations which is of importance when deciding how much you are 
willing to loose in the quest for a higher payoff.  
 
I would argue that the insignificance of education on risk aversion is design conditioned. This 
is also supported by the contradicting findings within in the literature of the effect of 
education on risk aversion, shown in chapter 3. The purpose of our risk game is to look at 
gender differences in risk aversion, not the effect of education on risk behavior. As shown in 
section 5.2, a high density of the participants’ has almost no schooling and education level is 
correlated with gender. For this reason, the risk experiment was designed with the intention 
that all participants had enough knowledge and information to make a rational, well-informed 
decision. As with age and health, this finding does not imply that education has no effect on 
                                                
16 The income measure used does not exclude the outliers. However I ran a test regression excluding these 
extreme observations, and the effect of income remained insignificant. 
17 I have also controlled for individual income alone, finding the same insignificant effect. Income and economic 
satisfaction are, as shown in 5.2, not correlated. 
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aversion towards risky investments in agriculture. However, this discussion exceeds the 
intention of this thesis. 
 
I control for principal activity in model (3), see table 10. As two of the participants have not 
reported their principal activity, the sample size is reduced from 560 to 558 participants.  
 
 !3       !"#$%&'!#"(!! =  ∝ +!!!"#$%!! + !!!"#$%&!!! + !!!"!! + !!ℎ!"#$ℎ! +!!!"#ℎ!"#$!! + !!!"#!"#$%&'($&)'%($"!! + !!!"#$%!! + !!!"!"#$%&'! +!!!!!! !"#$"%&#'#&!!" + !!,  i=1, … 558, k=1, … 4 
 
By including four dummy variables for the different categories of main activity, using 
agriculture as reference, there is no statistical evidence of gender-specific differences in risk 
aversion. The p-value is now reduced from p=0,0225 in model (1) to p=0,4304 in model (3). 
Ergo, the null-hypothesis that the gender coefficient is equal to zero,  !! = 0, is not rejected. 
The gender dummy was explaining the effect of housework as main activity on risk aversion. 
As shown in model (3), table 10, the dummy variable “Housework as Main Activity” is 
positive and has a p-value = 0,0049. Model (3) accordingly predicts that participants who 
report housework as main economic activity are significantly, at a 1% significance level, more 
risk averse than those who report agriculture as principal activity. The coefficient of the 
Housework as Main Activity dummy, !!", is further rather big; !!" = 3,136. A person 
reporting housework as main activity is thus estimated to switch to the safe choice more than 
3 choices before a participant reporting agriculture switches to the safe choice. There is no 
significant effect of the other main activities on risk aversion, hence participants reporting 
Animals, Paid Labor or Other as Main Activity are not statistically more or less risk averse 
than those working in agriculture. 
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Table  10.   Regression  Analysis  for  Risk  Aversion  amongst  our  Peruvian  sample  
  
Gender-Specific Difference in Risk Aversion,  p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
            Dependent 
              Variable 
 
Control 
Variables 
All Sample Limited Sample 
 
Risk Aversion 
(OLS) 
(1) 
Risk Aversion 
(OLS) 
(2) 
Risk Aversion 
(OLS) 
(3) 
Risk Aversion 
(OLS) 
(4) 
Risk Aversion 
(OLS) 
(5) 
Female 1.150** 1.239** 0.575 0.383 0.193 
 (0.0225) (0.0249) (0.4304) (0.4049) (0.7857) 
      
Apurimac  1.053* 0.762  1.648*** 
  (0.0644) (0.2528)  (0.0055) 
      
Age  -0.00464 -0.00625  -0.00215 
  (0.8339) (0.7781)  (0.9147) 
      
Health  0.235 0.287  0.344 
  (0.4048) (0.3188)  (0.2020) 
      
Math skills  0.560 0.558  0.748 
  (0.3625) (0.3699)  (0.1800) 
      
Satisfaction with   -0.710* -0.722*  -0.916** 
Economic Situation  (0.0912) (0.0906)  (0.0208) 
      
Individual Income  -0.00000720 -0.00000779  -0.0000112 
  (0.7863) (0.7683)  (0.6498) 
      
Level of Education  -0.189 -0.179  0.119 
  (0.7011) (0.7205)  (0.7823) 
      
Animals as Main    0.824  0.455 
Activity   (0.3394)  (0.5728) 
      
 
Paid Labor as    -0.141  0.259 
Main Activity   (0.9006)  (0.7833) 
      
Housework as   3.136***  2.438** 
Main Activity   (0.0049)  (0.0237) 
      
Other Main   -1.186  -2.026 
Activity   (0.5996)  (0.3465) 
      
Constant -6.584*** -6.885*** -6.810*** -5.649*** -6.720*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Observations 560 560 558 540 538 
R2 0.0083 0.0218 0.0294 0.0011 0.0481 
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 As shown in section 5.2, only women report housework as their principal activity, suggesting 
that there is still a gender difference in risk aversion. The participants live in a traditional 
society with a highly gender segregated work sphere; it could thus be assumed that women 
with housework as main economic activity are more risk averse because they are less used to 
deal with risky choices in their main activity, rather than that they choose housework because 
they are more risk averse. However, only a minority of the women participating in the risk 
game report housework to be their principal activity (see section 5.2). Looking at the activity-
specific risk preferences amongst the women, there are a higher percentage of women in 
housework that are highly risk averse, shown in table 11. As opposed to 43% of women 
working in agriculture, 79% of women in housework choose the first safe choice for !! ≤ 1 
Soles (shown in table 11). Also women working with animals18 have a lower percentage 
choosing the safe choice for !! ≤ 1 Soles than women with housework. As discussed above, 
housework is not connected with uncertain outcomes; women with high aversion towards risk 
might thus be drawn towards this occupation. Hence the causality might go both ways. 
Women in housework do not report a significant lower level of education, nor is housework 
significantly correlated19 with individual income or household income. There is neither a 
significant correlation20 between economic satisfaction and having housework as main 
activity. Even health, age and math skills are uncorrelated with housework as main activity. 
Hence there are no apparent differences between the women choosing housework to the 
women working in agriculture or with animals, except for a difference in risk aversion. This 
can be interpreted as that there is a difference in risk aversion between women and men in our 
sample, and these risk averse women have housework as main activity.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 I have also controlled for main activity with Animals as Main Activity as reference group, finding a significant 
and positive effect of Housework as Main Activity on risk aversion and no significant affect of Female on risk 
aversion. 
19 The p-value of the correlation coefficient between Individual Income and Housework as Main Activity within 
the women in the sample is equal to 0,8607 and p-value between household income and Housework as Main 
Activity is equal to 0,9869. There is neither a significant correlation when looking within the whole sample. 
20 The correlation coefficient has a p-value = 0,2980. There is neither a significant correlation when looking 
within the whole sample. 
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                                               Table  11.   First  Safe  Choice  by  Activity  for  Women  
First	  Safe	   Main	  Activity	  Choice	   Agriculture	   Animals	   Housework	   Paid	  Labor	   Other	  1	   32	  %	   47	  %	   74	  %	   67	  %	   20	  %	  2	   11	  %	   12	  %	   5	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	  3	   1	  %	   1	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	  4	   5	  %	   5	  %	   5	  %	   8	  %	   20	  %	  5	   3	  %	   1	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	  6	   6	  %	   2	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	  7	   0	  %	   2	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	   40	  %	  8	   5	  %	   5	  %	   5	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	  9	   0	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	  10	   8	  %	   4	  %	   0	  %	   8	  %	   0	  %	  11	   4	  %	   2	  %	   5	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	  12	   8	  %	   3	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	  13	   2	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	  14	   5	  %	   3	  %	   5	  %	   8	  %	   0	  %	  15	   0	  %	   2	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	  16	   2	  %	   3	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	   20	  %	  17	   1	  %	   2	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	  18	   3	  %	   2	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	  20	   2	  %	   2	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	   0	  %	  21	   0	  %	   1	  %	   0	  %	   8	  %	   0	  %	  	   	   	   	   	   	  Total	  Obs	   93	   150	   19	   12	   5	  
Note:	  The	  percentage	  of	  the	  women’s	  switching	  row	  for	  each	  safe	  choice	  by	  main	  activity.	  	  Numbers	  are	  rounded.	  
The region dummy, Apurimac, no longer has a significant effect on risk aversion. Hence the 
region differences in risk aversion were in part explaining the regional differences in 
occupation, 79% of the participants reporting housework as main activity are from Apurimac. 
Economic satisfaction still has a negative significant21 effect on risk aversion. The other 
control variables remain insignificant, indicating that activity has a fairly robust effect on risk 
aversion and the loss of significance of gender- specific differences in risk aversion. 
 
In the linear regression model (1) –(3) presented in table 10, the participants’ that never 
switch to the safe option are included. As demonstrated in section 5.1, the majority of these 
“no switchers” are men. I will now extend the analysis, adjusting my model by excluding 
these observations, reducing my sample from 560 observations to 540 observations.  
 
                                                
21  Significant at a 10% significance level 
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I will first analyze the effect of excluding the “no switchers” by regressing risk aversion on 
gender 
 
(M4)     !"!"#$%&!'(!! =  ∝ +!!!"#$%!! + !!, where i=1, … 540 
 
 
As demonstrated by model (4) in table 10, the difference of result is quite remarkable. The p-
value of the gender dummy Female is reduced from 0,0225 in model (1) to 0,4049, even 
without controlling for other variables. Thus by excluding extreme behavioral cases, there is 
no evidence of women being more risk averse than men. Ergo, the difference in risk behavior 
between women and men, found in model (1) and (2), seems to be driven by the extreme risk 
loving cases amongst men in the sample. By excluding these participants, there is no longer a 
statistical significant difference in risk aversion between women and men. This result is 
interesting from a poverty trap point of view, as the poverty trap postulates that risk aversion 
implies a lower adoption of more advanced and less familiar production methods. Hence 
women, as they are more risk averse, are predicted to make fewer risky but possibly 
rewarding investments. However, when the gender-difference in risk behavior is explained by 
more men being extremely risk loving, this conclusion is faulty. The “no switcher” behavior is 
more consistent with gambling behavior, which might result in investments that more often 
lead to a worse off state than leading the peasant out of poverty. The findings in model (1) and 
(2) might thus be read as “men in our sample exhibit more extreme risk loving behavior than 
women”.  
 
I will now investigate the effect of the control variables after having excluded the “no 
switchers”. As demonstrated in column 522 in table 10, the sample is now further reduced to 
538 participants 
 
                                                
22 It should be noted that the adjusted R-square has increased from 0,0294 in model (3) to 0,0481 in model (5), 
indicating that model (5) explains more of the variation. 
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!5       !"#$%&'!#"(!! =  ∝ +!!!"#$%!! + !!!"#$%&!!! + !!!"!! + !!ℎ!"#$ℎ! +!!!"#ℎ!"#$!! + !!!"#!"#$%&'($&)'%($"!! + !!!"#$%!! + !!!"!"#$%&'! +!!!!!"#$"%&#'#&!!" + !!,  i=1, … 538, k=2, … 5 
 
The p-value of the coefficient !! is increased from p=0,4049 in model (4) to 0,7857 in model 
(5); hence the gender dummy remains insignificant. An interesting development is that the p-
value of the region dummy decreases to 0,0055, making the region dummy significant in 
model (5) at a 1 % significance level. Being from Apurimac will now decrease the number of 
risky choices by 1,645, indicating that a participant from Apurimac is estimated to be more 
risk averse than a participant from Cusco. Looking at the “no-switcher”, 80% of the “no-
switchers” are from Apurimac; hence the gamblers were concealing the more risk averse 
behavior, indicating fewer observations within the more conservative range23 than Cusco. 
This supports the statement that risk behavior is culturally dependent. 
 
Economic satisfaction now has a more negative effect on risk aversion; the predicted effect 
also has a higher significance at a 5% level. By only investigating the behavior consistent 
with the expected utility theorem, a participant’s aspiration or income satisfaction has a more 
significant negative affect on risk aversion. This indicates that gambling behavior is not 
depended on how rich you feel or what your aspirations are. The housework dummy still has a 
positive, though slightly lower, effect on risk aversion. The p-value is further reduced from 
0,0049 to 0,0237. Thus women having housework as main activity is still more risk averse, 
though the effect is reduced by excluding the “no switchers”. None of the other control 
variables have a significant effect on risk aversion.  
 
The findings in model (1) to (5) thus indicate that there is a gender-specific difference in risk 
aversion within our sample, finding women to be more risk averse than men. However, the 
sudden insignificance of female when controlling for activity, proposes that the effect of sex 
might be catching up the effect of variables correlated with sex, such as occupation. On the 
other hand, the only activity with a significant (positive) effect on risk aversion is housework, 
and only women and a minority of the women, report housework as their primary activity. 
                                                
23 Conservative range meaning risk averse to mildly risk averse, see section 4.3. 
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This indicates that women are in fact more risk averse, and that more risk averse women tend 
to choose housework as main activity. Hence the direction of causality is problematic. 
Furthermore, the loss of gender-specific risk aversion in model (4) and (5) suggests that the 
difference in risk behavior seems to be a difference in extremely risk loving behavior, where 
the men in our sample exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion indicating gambling 
preferences. This finding supports one of Croson and Gneezy (2009) conclusions; that it is 
overconfidence amongst men which explains the difference in risk behavior between women 
and men.  
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Conclusion 
I have in this thesis looked into risk behavior amongst highland peasants in two regions in 
Peru, with the aim to investigate gender- specific differences in risk. I have used the data 
collected from a one-stage risk experiment to elicit risk behavior. I have further utilized data 
from a household survey24 and a questionnaire25 to control for some variables that often are 
correlated with both sex and risk aversion.  
 
I find that, without controlling for other variables, women in our sample are significantly 
more risk averse than men. However, the significance disappears when I control for principal 
economic activity, implying that gender does not affect attitudes towards risk. Furthermore, 
housework as principal activity is found to have a significant positive affect on risk aversion. 
As only women report housework as main activity, the evidence could imply that the 
difference in risk aversion between men and women is not biological, but a result of a gender 
segregated work sphere. However, the fact that only a minority of the women, report 
housework as main activity, leads to my belief that there nevertheless are sex-specific 
differences in risk aversion. Furthermore, this finding also indicates that risk attitudes might 
affect occupational choice. The result of the exclusion of the extremely risk loving 
observations implies further that the risk game was capturing the significant gender difference 
in extreme risk loving behavior, where the men in our sample are more risk loving than 
women.  
 
A high density of the participants in our sample is highly risk averse. There is also a fairly 
high density of extreme risk loving participants. The majority of the participants with an 
extreme risk loving behavior are men. My results thus indicate that there are differences 
between risk aversion amongst western university students and low-income farmers in the 
highlands of Peru, suggesting that there are correlations between highly risk averse behavior 
and poverty. However, I find no significant effect of income on risk aversion. Nonetheless, I 
suspect that this is a result of poor measurement. Satisfaction with own economic situation, on 
                                                
24 Conducted by the research project Land and Gender in Peru, NIBR 
25 Conducted by Ragnhild H. Bråten, the Frisch Centre 
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the other hand, is found to have a significant negative effect on risk aversion. This implies 
either that economic satisfaction is a better measure or that it is satisfaction with private 
economy that affects risk behavior. My results also support the finding that cultural 
characteristics influence risk attitudes.  
 
My thesis suggests that risk aversion is a result of several factors such as socio-economic 
variables, culturally dependent variables and possibly gender. The implication of risk 
behavior on the propensity to engage in risky investments, and the linkage between 
investments and positive payoffs, point to the importance of further knowledge of risk 
behavior in public policy analysis and implementations of pro-growth policies such as land 
titling amongst low-income farmers.   
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Appendix 
A.	  An	  Example	  of	  a	  Choice	  List	  to	  Elicit	  Behavior	  Towards	  Risk	  
	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  In	  this	  example	  of	  a	  choice	  list,	  the	  participant	  has	  chosen	  to	  switch	  to	  the	  safe	  amount	  at	  
choice	  5,	  when	  the	  safe	  amount	  was	  2,5	  Soles.	  The	  equivalent	  CE	  is	  thus	  2,25,	  and	  the	  
degree	  of	  risk	  aversion	  ! =0,54	  implying	  a	  risk	  averse	  participant.	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Choice	  List	  	  
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
[1]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   X	  
	  
	  	  
	  
Receive	  0,5	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[2]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   X	  
	  
	  	  
	  
Receive	  1	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[3]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   X	  
	  
	  	  
	  
Receive	  1,5	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[4]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   X	  
	  
	  	  
	  
Receive	  2	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[5]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  2,5	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[6]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  3	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[7]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  3,5	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[8]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  4	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[9]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  4,5	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[10]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  5	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[11]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  5,5	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[12]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  6	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[13]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  6,5	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[14]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  7	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[15]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  7,5	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[16]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  8	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[17]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  8,5	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[18]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  9	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[19]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	  
	  
X	  
	  
Receive	  9,5	  Sol	  for	  
sure	   	  	  
[20]	  
Draw	  a	  chip	  from	  
the	  bag	   	  	   	  	   X	   	  	  
Receive	  10	  Sol	  for	  
sure	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B.	  Instructions	  for	  Risk	  Game	  
	  
This	  exercise	  consists	  of	  two	  parts;	  we	  call	  them	  A26	  and	  B.	  In	  each	  part	  you	  must	  chose	  in	  20	  
different	  choice	  situations.	  We	  are	  only	  able	  to	  pay	  you	  real	  money	  for	  one	  of	  these	  choice	  situations	  
and	  this	  will	  be	  determined	  by	  these	  cards	  afterwards.	  You	  will	  draw	  one	  card	  from	  this	  pile	  of	  cards.	  
If	  you	  draw	  a	  red	  card,	  you	  will	  be	  paid	  for	  one	  of	  the	  A	  situations,	  if	  you	  draw	  a	  black	  card	  you	  will	  
be	  paid	  for	  one	  of	  the	  B	  situations.	  The	  number	  on	  the	  card	  determines	  which	  situation	  you	  will	  be	  
paid	  for	  (show	  the	  cards).	  	  
Prepare	  two	  sheets	  of	  papers	  at	  which	  you	  place	  money.	  One	  of	  the	  papers	  is	  for	  the	  safe	  option,	  the	  
other	  is	  for	  the	  risky	  option.	  The	  risky	  option	  paper	  is	  divided	  in	  two	  by	  a	  straight	  line,	  to	  represent	  the	  
good	  and	  the	  bad	  outcome.	  
We	  start	  with	  explaining	  the	  A	  situations.	  In	  this	  part	  of	  the	  game,	  you	  can	  choose	  between	  
drawing	  a	  chip	  from	  the	  brown	  bag	  (show	  the	  bag)	  and	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  win	  10	  soles,	  or	  just	  receive	  
a	   certain	   amount	   of	   money.	   If	   you	   choose	   to	   draw	   from	   the	   brown	   bag,	   how	   will	   it	   be	   decided	  
whether	  you	  get	  10	  soles	  or	  zero?	  In	  this	  bag	  there	  are	  10	  chips,	  5	  red	  chips	  and	  5	  blue	  chips	  (show).	  
Before	  drawing	  a	  chip,	  you	  must	  pick	  one	  of	  the	  colours	  to	  be	  your	  “winning	  colour”.	  To	  indicate	  your	  
choice,	  you	  place	  the	  chip	  with	  the	  chosen	  colour	  on	  the	  desk.	  Let	  us	  say	  you	  picked	  red.	  (Put	  a	  red	  
chip	  on	  the	  desk.)	  Then	  you	  draw	  a	  chip	  from	  the	  brown	  bag	  without	  looking.	  If	  you	  draw	  a	  red	  chip,	  
you	  will	  get	  10	  soles.	   If	   the	  chip	   is	  blue,	  you	  will	  not	  get	  anything.	   (Draw	  a	  chip	  and	  announce	   the	  
color	  as	  well	  as	  the	  payoff).	  	  
	  
In	  the	  first	  situation,	  you	  must	  choose	  between	  getting	  0,5	  sol	  for	  sure,	  or	  to	  draw	  from	  the	  brown	  
bag.	  If	  you	  choose	  the	  draw	  from	  the	  brown	  bag	  you	  might	  earn	  10	  soles,	  but	  you	  might	  also	  earn	  
nothing.	  (Illustrate	  with	  showing	  10	  soles	  on	  one	  side	  of	  the	  risky	  paper,	  and	  0,5	  sol	  on	  the	  safe	  paper)	  
In	  the	  next	  situation,	  you	  must	  choose	  between	  getting	  1	  sol	  for	  sure,	  or	  drawing	  from	  the	  brown	  bag	  
and	  possibly	  earn	  10	  soles	  (Illustrate	  with	  1	  sol	  on	  the	  safe	  option	  paper).	  In	  the	  next	  situation,	  the	  
safe	  option	  is	  1,5	  soles	  (Illustrate).	  The	  option	  to	  draw	  from	  the	  brown	  bag	  is	  always	  the	  same;	  you	  
might	  get	  10	  soles,	  and	  you	  might	  get	  nothing.	  The	  safe	  option	  is	  different	  in	  every	  choice	  situation;	  it	  
changes	  with	  0,5	  sol	  for	  every	  situation.	  	  
Do	  you	  understand	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  safe	  option	  and	  the	  option	  to	  draw	  from	  the	  brown	  
bag?	  
                                                
26 Part A is the risky prospect. Part B is for the ambiguous prospect. As this prospect is not relevant for my 
thesis, I will not include the instruction for part B.   
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Let’s	  look	  at	  the	  first	  choice	  situation.	  Now,	  the	  safe	  choice	  gives	  you	  0,5	  sol	  in	  any	  case.	  Remember,	  
if	  you	  draw	  from	  the	  brown	  bag	  you	  might	  earn	  10	  soles	  and	  you	  might	  earn	  nothing	  (Illustrate	  with	  
money	  on	  paper	  again.)	  Would	  you	  like	  to	  take	  the	  certain	  0,5	  sol	  or	  draw	  from	  the	  brown	  bag?	  	  
Now,	  the	  safe	  option	  gives	  you	  1	  sol.	  Drawing	  from	  the	  brown	  bag	  still	  gives	  you	  the	  chance	  to	  earn	  
10	  soles.	  (Illustrate	  with	  1	  sol	  on	  the	  safe	  paper).	  Do	  you	  choose	  the	  safe	  option	  or	  to	  draw	  from	  the	  
brown	  bag?	  
Continue	  with	  decreasing	  the	  value	  of	  the	  safe	  option,	  0,5	  sol	  at	  a	  time.	  Once	  the	  participant	  chooses	  
the	  safe	  option,	  ask	  “Does	  that	  mean	  that	  you	  want	  the	  safe	  option	  in	  all	  the	  choices	  with	  a	  higher	  
safe	  option	  as	  well?”	  If	  affirmative	  answer,	  fill	  out	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  rows	  accordingly.	  If	  not,	  continue	  
increasing	  value	  with	  0,5	  sol	  at	  a	  time.	  	  	  
	  Participant	  can	  always	  change	  their	  mind	  about	  previous	  choices	  within	  the	  same	  exercise.	  
 
 
